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Abstract
This paper explores the differences in antitrust law between the United States (US) and European
Union (EU) through the lens of cultural, political, and legal values. In regards to culture, the US
and EU differ with respect to government involvement and public opinion, and such is reflected in
each nation’s antitrust policies. Within the political realm, party values—namely conservatism or
liberalism—and historical legislation—namely the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, Celler-Kefauver Act,
and European Community (EC) Treaty—play a key role in the enforcement of antitrust law.
Similarly, antitrust is approached differently in the US and EU with respect to legal values. This
paper analyzes the cases of Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v.
US (1911), Brown v. Board of Education, and US v. Microsoft (2011) to demonstrate the varying
legal values inherent to the US and EU and how such values will play a role in the future of
antitrust in both nations..
Introduction
Throughout history, two global superpowers have made their mark on the field of antitrust. The US
—armed with the Sherman Antitrust Act—and EU—armed with Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty
—have developed worldly reputations concerning the enforcement of competition law. The
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 was originally brought before Congress to combat trusts and cartels
that had become widespread throughout the country (Cornell, 2010). Historically, the Sherman Act
is one of the simplest pieces of legislation to exist. It contains two highly relevant sections in
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relation to this paper—the first makes contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of
trade illegal while the second section deems monopolization and attempts to monopolize illegal
(Cornell, 2010). In addition, the Clayton Act of 1914 and the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950 were
introduced as additions to the Sherman Act. These amendments and sections will be analyzed
later in regards to their significance. In relation to the EU, Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty
nearly mirror Sections 1 and 2 of their US counterpart. According to Bumgardner (2005), Article 81
prohibits cartels and other practices that distort competition. Article 82 prohibits the abuse of
dominant power in the market (Bumgardner, 2005). Of importance is the fact that the EC Treaty
was reformed into the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Under this
reformation, Articles 81 and 82 became Articles 101 and 102. Essentially, the original language
was kept intact, but the new articles allowed for expansion under the original rules, much like the
amendments to the Sherman Act (Bumgardner, 2005). These new EU competition articles will be
analyzed in further detail throughout the latter portion of this paper.
Furthermore, the inherent values of the US and EU can be critically analyzed in relation to the
enforcement of antitrust law. Historically, the US is much more conservative than its rather liberal
EU counterpart (Horton & Schmitz, 2002). Thus, one can analyze the US and EU in regards to
their inherent cultural, political, and legal values and the effect these values have had on the field
of antitrust law.
United States
First, US values can be analyzed from a cultural standpoint. Going back to the late 1700s, America
was founded on the notion of freedom and equality (Peritz, 1996). That being said, one must keep
in mind that for much of America’s history, equality did not mean equal opportunity across the
board (Peritz, 1996). The Civil War put a stop to slavery and the Emancipation Proclamation
declared African-Americans to be free—but that freedom only extended so far. The landmark case
Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) created the ‘separate but equal’ doctrine, stating that so long as public
facilities were equal in stature, racial segregation was constitutional. Thus, the Supreme Court, in
a 7-1 decision, indicated that although African-Americans had been freed, the courts still had the
power to alter that freedom in any given situation (Plessy v. Ferguson, 1896). It would be nearly
sixty years until the ‘separate but equal’ doctrine was repealed. In Brown v. Board of Education
(1954), the Supreme Court delivered a landmark ruling that declared racial segregation to be
unconstitutional in schools. The 9-0 decision under the Warren Court helped renew the
fundamental ideals of true equality and sparked an era of racial reform in which integration was at
the forefront.
In conjunction with this heightened level of equality, the idea of fairness has long played a role in
American culture and is still prevalent today (Horton, 2011a). In order for anything to be considered
fair, one may believe that every person should have an equal opportunity to succeed. Or one may
believe that rules and guidelines should be designed in such a way that limits any one person from
having an advantage over the other. In addition, one may reason that reciprocity, giving something
to receive something else, should be taken into account. But according to Horton (2011a), the
problem with applying these values to antitrust lies in the fact that the Chicago School of
economics does not endorse them.
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According to Horton (2011a), the Chicago School embraces the ideals of concentration in the
marketplace and survival of the fittest. The difficulty in embracing the idea that bigger is better,
however, lies in society’s general belief in the fundamental values of fairness and ethics as
previously detailed. The Chicago School purports that a concentrated marketplace of mergers and
combinations results in greater efficiency in which values have no significance. But as Horton
(2011a) argues, “Efficiency . . . improves with an increasingly shared set of motivations . . . related
to trust, fairness, and cooperation” (p. 500). Stemming from the idea of evolutionary biology, values
foster morality, which in turn holds society together. This morality reflects inherent generosity the
Chicago School does not account for. As such, the moral values of fairness and reciprocity work to
create a free, but fair, market in which innate cultural values are kept intact. In essence, the
cultural values of fairness, freedom, and equality are certainly important and can further be applied
to the US from a political and legal perspective.
As history has shown time and time again, politics tend to dictate the rigor with which antitrust
cases are enforced and the ways in which they are decided (Peritz, 1996). Historically, America is
politically conservative but that status alone does not serve as the greatest reflection of Supreme
Court decisions in antitrust law. Rather, the best indicator may be public opinion and policy during
a given political era. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. explained, “We do not realize how large
a part of our law is open to reconsideration upon a slight change in the habit of the public mind”
(Adams & Brock, 2004, p. 104). Adams and Brock (2004) further argue that the ethos of a
particular time affect judicial outcomes. Mr. Dooley echoed their argument by saying that “the
Supreme Court follows the election returns” (Adams & Brock, 2004, p. 104).
For instance, during Franklin D. Roosevelt’s (FDR) time as president, he came to be known as the
‘trust buster’. The former president created stricter enforcement of antitrust law during an era that
came to be known as the New Deal. Public opinion began to shift rather dramatically and the
Supreme Court handed down many more rulings that declared monopolies to be in violation of the
Sherman Act (Peritz, 1996). In contrast, the Ronald Reagan era was marked by a severe lack of
enforcement of antitrust law. Upon taking office, Reagan declared that he would not be focusing
his efforts on the enforcement of such laws because they ran contrary to the concept of laissezfaire (Adams & Brock, 2004). As a result, antitrust was not in the political spotlight, and it did not
take priority from a public policy standpoint.
The fact of the matter is, therefore, that antitrust enforcement depends largely upon political timing
but also upon the language with which laws can be enforced. It is for this reason that two key
amendments were added to the original Sherman Act. As mentioned previously, the first was the
Clayton Act of 1914. The Clayton Act was introduced in the legislature primarily as a result of the
Standard Oil decision. In Standard Oil (1911), the Supreme Court found the company to be in
violation of the Sherman Act after restricting trade through anticompetitive behavior. As a
repercussion, the court ordered the company to be divided into geographically competing parts.
However, the court did not anticipate that Standard Oil would merge its subsections to culminate
an even greater profit than before. To prevent similar legal loopholes, the Clayton Act came into
being, as did another piece of legislation designed to regulate antitrust enforcement. According to
Peritz (1996), the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act sought to expand
federal enforcement powers of antitrust laws. Both acts introduced a shift away from the commonlaw language of ‘property’ to include ‘competition’, a word never written in the original Sherman
Act. Specifically, Peritz (1996) articulates that the Clayton Act would set stricter guidelines in
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regards to specific acts such as price-fixing and unlawful mergers. In addition, the FTC Act would
create a new federal agency designed to regulate unfair competitive conduct (Peritz, 1996).
The Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950 also brought about significant political changes to the
enforcement of the Sherman Act (Peritz, 1996). Initiated by former Congressmen Emmanual Celler
(D-NY) and Estes Kefauver (D-TN), the Act sought to prevent the abuse of economic power and
concentration (Peritz, 1996). As Peritz (1996) states, the Celler-Kefauver Act applied most
significantly to Section 7 of the Clayton Act (pp. 196-197). First, the Celler-Kefauver Act closed the
assets loophole, which failed to mention the acquisition of assets in restraint of trade; it only
mentioned anticompetitive stock acquisitions (Peritz, 1996). Peritz (1996) believes this loophole
resulted from political debate concerning the value of competition versus that of a person’s
property rights. Second, the Celler-Kefauver Act extended Section 7 of the Clayton Act to include
all corporate mergers, not only those between competitors in direct competition. Thus, legislation
was influenced as a result of public opinion, reflected through the Celler-Kefauver Act, at the time
(Peritz, 1996).
Finally, America’s legal values can be analyzed with respect to antitrust law and its application. US
courts were founded on the value of justice in that the guilty individual is held responsible for the
crime or tort committed (Peritz, 1996). The problem with serving justice in the field of antitrust lies
in the complexity of the issue and the vigor with which the laws are actively enforced. According to
Adams and Brock (2004), antitrust issues are inherently economic but any violations must be dealt
with through the complex legal system. Justice is also hard to come by as a result of the level at
which antitrust laws are enforced by separate agencies. Clearly, the courts can only try cases
which fall within their jurisprudence (Peritz, 1996). If agencies do not pursue probable antitrust
violations due to the lengthy process of preparation, litigation, or possible case dismissal, then the
courts cannot hand down judgments to any anticompetitive companies (Peritz, 1996).
As Adams and Brock (2004) further state, a third problem within the justice system lies in the
courts’ interpretation of the facts. Decisions are often influenced by public policy as explained
previously. Public policy can further determine how judges interpret the exact same set of facts—
that is, whether the court employs a Rule of Reason or per se approach. The Rule of Reason is
used when deciding a case based on the totality of the circumstances whereas the per se
approach is characterized as a bright-line rule (Peritz, 1996).
Two cases which exemplify the workings of the legal system in both the US and EU are those of
the General Electric/Honeywell merger and Microsoft. In 2000, General Electric (GE) announced
that it would be acquiring the already-large company of Honeywell. US authorities approved the
powerful horizontal merger, saying it would improve competition and ultimately lead to lower prices
(Elliot, 2001). The EU’s approach, which differed greatly from the US, will be analyzed further in
the upcoming EU section.
In regards to US v. Microsoft (2001), the US and EU again took very different approaches. In 1998,
the Department of Justice and twenty other states brought a lawsuit against Microsoft alleging
violation of the Sherman Act (Brinkley & Lohr, 2001). The case was heard under Judge Penfield
Jackson who concluded that Microsoft was guilty of monopolization, attempt of monopolization,
and tying under Section 2 of the Sherman Act (Brinkley & Lohr, 2001). After hearing testimony of
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Microsoft’s threats to smaller companies and its plans to tie the software to Internet Explorer,
Judge Jackson ordered a remedy in which Microsoft would be split into two entities (Brinkley &
Lohr, 2001). Microsoft immediately appealed the judgment and was re-tried in the Court of
Appeals. The second court affirmed the monopolization violation but reversed the attempt to
monopolize violation and determined that the Rule of Reason, rather than per se, should be
applied to the tying violation. For that reason, the Court of Appeals remanded on the tying issue
and ordered that remedies be vacated (Brinkley & Lohr, 2001). As Adams and Brock (2004)
contend, the Microsoft case dealt heavily with the idea of a ‘thrust upon’ conundrum. The US
insisted that Microsoft had taken anticompetitive steps to maintain its operating systems monopoly,
but Microsoft contended that its monopoly was merely the result of superior skill and success in
the marketplace (Adams & Brock, 2004). Ultimately, the Microsoft case was settled out of court as
a result of the Court of Appeals ruling in 2001 (Brinkley & Lohr, 2001).
In sum, the US operates through inherent cultural, political, and legal values including freedom,
equality, conservatism, and justice. As exemplified through the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, and
Celler-Kefauver Act, the field of antitrust is influenced at least in part by public opinion, giving rise
to varying applications of the law within the justice system. In the final section of this paper, the
same three categories encompassing culture, politics, and the law shall be analyzed with respect
to the EU.
European Union
First, one can analyze the cultural values of the EU with respect to competition law. According to
the European Commission (2007), a Commission study of citizens residing in EU member states
showed that the values of peace and environmental protection are of utmost importance.
Reportedly, 61% of Europeans surveyed said that peace should be preserved and enforced in
European society. Respect for nature was ranked second with 50% of the vote. American-based
values such as freedom of speech and entrepreneurship were ranked much lower on the list,
receiving 37% and 10% of the vote respectively (European Commission, 2007). With respect to
antitrust law in the EU, these values indicate that the consumer matters. Whereas the US is more
concerned with promoting competition as a whole, the EU tends to focus more on protecting the
specific competitor and consumer involved (Bumgardner, 2005). This cultural foundation leads one
to analyze the EU’s political values, as well.
While the US is inherently conservative, the EU is inherently liberal. Horton and Schmitz (2002)
contend that ordo-liberal Europeans—those who emphasize the importance of free markets—
believe that economic freedom is directly related to political freedom. As such, widespread
competition is designed to promote economic well-being for consumers and competitors. Indeed,
as Horton (2011b) explains in an article on US merger guidelines, the US has recently seemed to
craft its antitrust law to converge with that of the EU. He further contends that if the US fails to
respond to economic liberalism it will ultimately lose its place as a worldwide leader in antitrust.
The EU’s motive to protect competitors ties directly into Europeans’ views of government
involvement. According to the Pew Research Center (2011), a study of American and European
values found that nearly 60% of Americans believe the ability to pursue goals without state
interference is more important than the state interfering to help the needy. In contrast, three EU
member states—Spain, Germany, and France—are in favor of increased government involvement
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by a percentage of roughly 65%. This call for increased government involvement can be observed
through the EU’s antitrust laws, which were strengthened in the adoption of the TFEU in 2009.
As alluded to previously, Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty served as the primary law regulating
competition until the treaty was amended through the Treaty of Lisbon (European Union, 2011).
The ratification of this treaty brought into effect the TFEU which was partially designed to
strengthen competition laws in order to better protect competitors in the market (European Union,
2011). Upon adopting the TFEU, Articles 81 and 82 were amended and became Articles 101 and
102. While the fundamental principles remain the same, the primary difference lies in the
expansion of the Articles’ language. According to the European Commission (2012a), Article 101
establishes that concerted practices—such as cartels, conspiracies, and consolidations—are
illegal when competition is prevented, restricted, or distorted. Such concerted practices that would
be considered a violation of Article 101 include direct or indirect price-fixing, controlling or limiting
production or investment, sharing the market, deliberately placing competitors at an unfair
disadvantage, and unfair contracts (European Commission, 2012a).
Furthermore, Article 102 sets forth the competition legalities concerning the abuse of power. Under
Article 102, many of the same concerted practices apply that were detailed in Article 101.
According to the European Commission (2012b), the inherent difference lies in the ‘abuse of
dominant position’ clause. Article 102 articulates that such abuse within the internal market shall
be deemed incompatible and in violation of the article so long as trade could be restricted between
EU member states.
Finally, the EU can be analyzed from a legal perspective. Much like the US, the EU courts are
concerned primarily with serving justice. The primary difference lies in the vigor with which the two
nations enforce competition law. While US antitrust laws are typically considered more powerful in
nature, the EU has enforced its competition laws much more vigorously in practice (Bumgardner,
2005). This can be regarded as both inherently good and bad. From the EU’s perspective, strict
enforcement of antitrust laws helps protect the competitor. But the EU also takes much greater
steps than the US in finding anticompetitive behavior in the first place. Such steps, which included
dawn raids of public offices, were heavily enforced during Mario Monti’s term as Competition
Commissioner—the officer responsible for overseeing competition within the European Union.
Under the law, EU officials could raid business offices if they had a reasonable suspicion that
anticompetitive behavior was taking place (Bumgardner, 2005).
The EU’s aggressive approach to the enforcement of competition law can be analyzed with
respect to two cases mentioned previously—the GE/Honeywell merger and Microsoft. Despite the
fact that the US had already approved the merger between the two US-based companies, the EU
blocked it. According to Horton and Schmitz (2002), this indicates that the Chicago School’s high
regard for efficiency has failed to catch on in the EU. Instead, the EU disregarded GE/Honeywell’s
argument in favor of efficiency because EU competition law is more concerned with the effect on
competitors in the long run, not any usefulness such a merger may have in the short run (Horton &
Schmitz, 2002).
Finally, the Microsoft case lends itself to key legal differences between the US and EU. As
explained previously, the US ultimately settled the Microsoft case out of court after the initial
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finding of fault was considerably reversed. Despite this landmark US decision, the EU found
Microsoft to be in violation of competition law. Specifically, the EU determined that Microsoft had
not complied with a 2009 court order to allow consumers a choice of browsers. As a result, experts
believe that the EU will harshly penalize Microsoft in order to use it as an example for other noncompliant companies (T. J. Horton, personal communication, September 27, 2012). Although
Microsoft blamed the failure of compliance on a technical problem, it is likely that the EU will
impose hefty fines and strict orders (T. J. Horton, personal communication, October 24, 2012). As
of September 2012, Microsoft had already been fined more than $1.25 billion for past failures to
comply. As a result of its non-compliance with the 2009 order, Microsoft could be fined up to 10%
of its yearly revenue, totaling $7.4 billion (T. J. Horton, personal communication, September 27,
2012). This legal difference between the US and EU is substantial as it indicates that the EU
pursues antitrust justice more aggressively and often with greater impositions than its US
counterpart.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the US and EU differ in regards to the application of their cultural, political, and legal
values to the field of antitrust. While the US values independence, fairness, and overall equality,
the EU values peace and government oversight. Politically, the US leans toward the conservative
side while the EU tends to be more liberal. Legally, both nations are concerned with serving
justice, but historically the EU has done so more aggressively. The application of such differing
values helps to explain the two approaches in trying antitrust cases. Furthermore, by analyzing
such inherent values one may understand the fundamental differences in the evolving world of
antitrust and work to strengthen it in such a way that betters society while preserving competition.
If the US intends to remain a global superpower in law and politics, it must continue to shift its
antitrust policy to more clearly align with that of the EU. Doing so will forge a more compatible
alliance between the two nations and create an antitrust policy free of loopholes, adverse political
and cultural influences. Indeed, if the US and EU can create a global antitrust agenda, both will
prosper in the legal realm while remaining in the forefront of international leadership. But, as with
most policies, only time will tell whether either converges with the other.
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